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MANAGING SPACE TO MANAGE GROWTH
DANIEL R. MANDELKER*
Oregonians don't like sprawl, but they don't like high
density either.
-John A. Kitzhaber, Governor of Oregon
As growth management programs come of age, experience can tell
us how they work and what can make them more effective. Strategies that
manage space to manage growth are important elements in these programs.
Space management directs development to one part of an urban area, but
limits it elsewhere, to attain the policies that growth management adopts.
This article examines two longstanding growth management
programs that rely on space management: the tiered growth program in San
Diego, and the urban growth boundary program in Oregon, as carried out in
Portland. The article first reviews the goals that growth management seeks
to achieve. It then discusses the San Diego and Portland programs, focusing
on the strategies adopted in these programs and the extent to which they
were successful. Finally, this article concludes with recommendations for
improving space management strategies.
I. URBAN SPRAWL AND THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT MOVEMENT
Growth management began in the 1960s to provide new techniques
for managing rapid and uncontrolled growth through urban sprawl. Though
there is no consensus on a definition of sprawl, commentators usually
characterize it as low-density development that expands as leapfrog
noncontiguous development from the core of metropolitan areas.'
* Stamper Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. The author would like
to thank Nico Calavita, Bob Einsweiler, Frances Foster, Bob Freilich, Wendie
Kellington, Stuart Meck, Doug Porter, and Ed Sullivan for their valuable comments on
an earlier draft of this article. Of course, the author's analysis and opinions are his own.
The text adopts the definition of sprawl used throughout TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RE-
SEARCH PROGRAM, REP. 39, THE COSTS OF SPRAWL-REVISITED (1998). See also
Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in the
United States, 5 HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137, 140-42 (1999)
(defining sprawl as "low-density residential and nonresidential intrusions into rural and
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Regulations for the Florida state land use planning program define urban
sprawl as premature and poorly planned conversion of rural land, and
development that does not relate to adjacent land uses and does not make
maximum use of existing public facilities.2
Critics of sprawl would point to its many problems.' These include
higher capital and operating costs for private and public facilities, higher
transportation and travel costs, and the excessive consumption of
agricultural and sensitive lands. They also include the deterioration in the
quality of life, and social impacts, such as suburban exclusion and a
mismatch ofjobs and housing.4
undeveloped areas, and with less certainty as leapfrog, segregated, and land-consuming
in its typical form").
2 "Urban sprawl" means urban development or uses which are located in predominantly
rural areas, or rural areas interspersed with generally low-intensity or low-density urban
uses, and which are characterized by one or more of the following conditions: (a) The
premature or poorly planned conversion of rural land to other uses; (b) The creation of
areas of urban development or uses which are not functionally related to land uses which
predominate the adjacent area; or (c) The creation of areas of urban development or uses
which fail to maximize the use of existing public facilities or the use of areas within
which public services are currently provided. Urban sprawl is typically manifested in
one or more of the following land use or development patterns: leapfrog or scattered
development; ribbon or strip commercial or other development; or large expanses of
predominantly low-intensity, low-density, or single-use development. See FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. § 9J-5.003(134) (1999).
' Although the anti-sprawl position has considerable appeal, defenders of sprawl dispute
the arguments that sprawl threatens natural resources and creates higher government
costs, and deny that it is a serious social problem. See, e.g., SAMUEL R. STALEY, THE
SPRAWLING OF AMERICA: IN DEFENSE OF THE DYNAMIC CITY 14-15 (1999) (claiming
that the "sprawl index" is declining, that urban development does not threaten
agriculture, that the effect of suburbanization on local government costs is exaggerated,
and that air quality deteriorates at higher densities). See generally, e.g., Peter Gordon &
Harry W. Richardson, Are Compact Cities a Desirable Planning Goal?, 63 J. AM. PLAN.
ASS'N 95 (1997) (explaining benefits of urban sprawl, including opportunities for infill
development). See also Ivonne Audriac et al., Ideal Urban Form and the Dilemma of the
Good Life: Florida's Growth Management Dilemma, 56 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 470 passim
(1990) (noting that sprawl is a response to market preferences, and that attempts to
control it will likely drive up land and housing values); Gregg Easterbrook, Suburban
Myth, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 15, 1999, at 18 (arguing that sprawl is not entirely negative
because besides the fact that the alternatives and proposals to remedy sprawl are
unrealistic to implement, people actually enjoy some of the effects of sprawl).
' See Reid Ewing, Is Los Angeles-Style Sprawl Desirable?, 63 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 107,
117-18 (1997). See generally TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note
1; Symposium, Urban Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 157, 158-251 (1997) (citing specific
examples of increased costs and pollution caused by sprawl).
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The criticism that urban sprawl increases capital facility and service
costs gained major support in an early influential study. It showed the cost
of servicing scattered and low-density development is much higher than the
cost of servicing compact development at higher densities.5  Critics
contested these findings,6 but most studies conclude that lower densities and
urban sprawl do result in higher capital facility costs.7 Studies have also
found modest, but cumulatively significant, reductions in operating costs for
compact rather than sprawl development! These findings are important to
the legal basis for growth management programs that remedy this problem.
Courts have held, and are likely to continue to hold, that land use programs
requiring the orderly provision of services and facilities at optimal cost is a
legitimate governmental objective in growth management.9
A related timing problem is that rapid development may overwhelm
a community so that it cannot provide facilities and services when new
development needs them. Local governments can handle this problem by
providing necessary facilities in advance before growth occurs, but few have
the resources to do so."0 Growth management can time development so that
See generally REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., THE COSTS OF SPRAWL (1974).
6 See, e.g., Alan A. Altshuler, Book Review, 43 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 207, 208 (1977)
(asserting that the study underestimated demand for services from higher-density
development and mixed density and unit size effects). See generally, e.g., Duane
Windsor, A Critique of The Costs of Sprawl, 45 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 279 (1979) (book
review) (commenting on the failure to disentangle density from other factors and a
failure to credit sprawl as a response to market preferences).
' See TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 46-49. See also
ROBERT W. BURCHELL & DAVID LISTOKIN, LAND, INFRASTRUCTURE, HOUSING COSTS
AND FISCAL IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH GROWTH: THE LITERATURE ON THE IMPACTS OF
SPRAWL V. MANAGED GROWTH 10 (1995) (claiming that planned development and
growth can result in reduced costs to communities); Jerry Weitz & Terry Moore,
Development Inside Urban Growth Boundaries: Oregon's Empirical Evidence of
Contiguous Urban Form, 64 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 424, 430-34 (1998) (asserting that
sprawl and scattered development costs more than contiguous and planned development
because it is an inefficient use of land and resources). See, e.g., The Sierra Club, The
Dark Side of the American Dream: The Costs and Consequences of Suburban Sprawl
(visited Nov. 14, 1998) <http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/report98/costs.htrnl#who>
("Providing services to new development has grown so costly in Prince William County,
Virginia, near Washington, D.C., that even though the county has the highest property-
tax rate in the Commonwealth, every new house brings a $1,688 shortfall.").
'See TRANSIT COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 50-52.
9 See Golden v. Ramapo Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 301-03 (N.Y. 1972), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
'0 See ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, COMMUNITY GROWTH: POLICIES, TECHNIQUES, AND
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local governments can budget and plan for needed services and facilities.
Policy makers who became concerned with urban sprawl soon
realized that zoning cannot handle the sprawl problem. Originally a static
system that designated where development could occur, zoning gradually
became a more flexible process in which local governments could review
development proposals as they were presented for review. Though this
process could have controlled the rate, timing, and character of growth, it
did not do so because comprehensive plans, and thus land development
regulations, did not consider these issues."l
Because the problems that drive growth management programs vary,
it is difficult to define what growth management does. The conventional
understanding is that growth management influences the rate, amount, type,
location and quality of growth. One topology lists four types of controls:
adequate public facilities programs that prohibit development unless
adequate public facilities are available, phased growth programs that
determine when to allow development, urban growth boundary programs
that set limits on urban growth, and rate-of-growth programs that establish a
defined growth rate.'2
These strategies reflect the various origins of the growth
management movement. Some focus on the provision of public facilities
and try to time the provision of these facilities with new development.
Other strategies manage space, and attempt to regulate the rate of growth or
determine where development should locate. Programs with spatial
dimensions, such as urban growth boundary programs, 3 control the shape
and form of development. Space management is new to American land use
planning, though it has long been a key element of land use planning in
other countries. An example is the British Green Belt program, which limits
the growth of cities to preserve agricultural land and prevent urban sprawl. 4
IMPACTS 20 (1993).
" See Edward J. Kaiser & David R. Godschalk, Twentieth Century Land Use Planning,
61 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 365, 365-66 (1995).
2 See ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, PLANNING, GROWTH, AND PUBLIC FACILITIES: A PRIMER
FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS 16 (1993).
" For further discussions of urban growth boundary programs see TOM DANIELS, WHEN
CITY AND COUNTRY COLLIDE 187-209 (1999), V. GAIL EASLEY, STAYING INSIDE THE
LINES: URBAN GROWTH BOUNDARIES, 16-27 (1992), DOUGLAS R. PORTER, MANAGING
GROWTH IN AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES 61-69 (1997), and Ned Farquhar, Zoning Fallout:
The Implications of Urban Growth Boundary Designations, ZONING NEWS, Mar. 1999, at
1.
" For an early account of this program see generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, GREEN
BELTS AND URBAN GROWTH (1962).
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Space management programs are especially critical because they
dramatically affect the spatial form of development in ways not typical in
American tradition. They are good faith efforts to modify development
patterns to provide a more desirable pattern for urban growth. Urban growth
boundaries, for example, establish a boundary line beyond which new
development cannot occur. These programs have major effects on the land
market because they prevent development where it otherwise might occur
and because they direct development to areas where it might not otherwise
occur. Space management programs also have an implicit preference for
higher-density, compact urban development in areas where development can
occur.'5 This high-density preference is a corollary to the criticism of low-
density sprawl, which is considered wasteful and difficult to service.
Two major growth management programs in western cities have
made use of space management for over a quarter of a century. They
deserve study as examples of how these programs work. One is the tiered
system of growth management in San Diego, California. The other is the
urban growth boundary in place in Portland, Oregon, which the state
planning program requires.
II. TIERED GROWTH IN SAN DIEGO 6
San Diego, though it has cycled through boom and bust periods, is
one of the fastest-growing cities in the country. It is also one of the most
desirable. Growth management became a major issue in the 1970s, when
growth accelerated. The city was large enough, and had enough
undeveloped area, so that a growth management strategy made sense within
the city limits. When growth became a major problem in the 1970s, the city
"s See generally DOWELL MYERS & ALICIA KITSUSE, THE DEBATE OVER FUTURE
DENSITY OF DEVELOPMENT: AN INTERPRETIVE REVIEW (1999) (discussing the density
issue and conflicting reports on the impact of sprawl on urban development in California)
(on file with author).
6 For more in-depth commentary on the San Diego program see generally ROBERT H.
FREILICH, BATTLE AGAINST SPRAWL: SMART GROWTH SYSTEMS USING THE RAMAPO
APPROACH (1999); DOUGLAS R. PORTER ET AL., PROFILES IN GROWTH MANAGEMENT
81-87 (1996); Nico Calavita, Growth Machines and Ballot Box Planning, 14 J. URB.
AFF. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Calavita, Ballot Box]; Douglas R. Porter, San Diego's Brand
of Growth Management: A for Effort, C for Accomplishment, 48 URB. LAND, at 21
(1989) [hereinafter Porter, Effort]. See also Nico Calavita, Vale of Tiers, PLANNING,
Mar. 1997, at 18 (criticizing San Diego's growth management program as well-
intentioned but ineffective against development interests).
1999]
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called in a national consultant who had prepared and successfully defended a
phased growth program in New York State. 7 This consultant proposed a
tiered growth management program for San Diego. 8 The introductory chap-
ter of his report details the purpose and strategy of the program:
The growth strategy supports neither extreme of unrestrained
expansion nor the complete cessation of growth. Rather, it
conceives that urban growth will occur in logically defined
increments phased with and/or adjusted to the City's capacity
for accommodating such increments. 9
This statement shows that the principal objective of the program was the
provision of facilities needed to serve new development.2 ° Its principal
concerns were the staging and timing of growth, the timely provision of
public facilities within areas where growth could occur, and a requirement
that new development should pay the capital costs it requires.2'
The city also faced several space management problems. Downtown
and inner city areas were not attracting enough new development, while
excessive development threatened the northern tier. This type of growth
pattern would ultimately have produced low-density sprawl in outlying
areas, while the inner city declined. The city also has important wetlands,
canyons and other natural resource areas that residents value, which new
development threatened.
As adopted, the program has three growth tiers: an urbanized tier, a
planned urbanizing tier, and an urban reserve tier.22 The consultant's
'" Professor Robert H. Freilich prepared the program as consultant to the city of San
Diego. Professor Freilich was renowned for recently having won a major case, Golden v.
Ramapo Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (N.Y. 1972), in
the New York Court of Appeals, thereby sustaining a growth management program he
had developed for the Town of Ramapo (a suburb of New York City). The Ramapo
program allowed new development only when adequate public facilities and services
were available.
s See ROBERT H. FREILICH, A GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR SAN DIEGO (1976)
(on file with author).
'9 Id. at 2-5.
2 See John W. Witt & Janis Samartino-Gardner, Growth Management v. Vested Rights,
One City's Experience: A Case Study of San Diego, 20 URB. LAW. 647, 650 (1988).
21 Professor Freilich stated that another purpose of the program was to organize growth in
the planned urbanizing tier through a transportation corridor approach. See generally
FREILICH, supra note 16.
22 See FREILICH, supra note 18, at 4-1, 5-1, 6-1.
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proposal encouraged growth in the urbanized tier, staged growth in the
planned urbanizing tier,23 and deferred growth for fifteen to twenty years in
the urban reserve. It also included an environmental tier intended to protect
the area's canyons, steep slopes and other natural resources, but the city did
not adopt it.24 The growth management program only applies to residential
development, because it assumed nonresidential development will carry its
fair share of needed improvement costs and does not affect the need for
schools, parks and libraries.25
The consultant's proposal included different policies and objectives
for each tier, most of them regulatory, though it proposed other measures,
such as redevelopment, where it was necessary in the urbanized tier. There
was no strategy for allocating growth to designated areas within the tiers
where the program allowed growth. Neither was enough attention paid to
the need for capital improvements in the urbanized tier, though there was a
brief discussion of a capital improvements program.26 In the planned
urbanizing tier the city adopted a special benefits assessment, which the
courts eventually upheld,27 that carried out the program's proposal to shift
the cost of new facilities to developers. In the urban reserve the principal
control was large lot zoning at a minimum of ten acres for each dwelling
unit. This type of zoning protects land from urban growth because the
density it allows is too low to allow development at an intensive scale.
The San Diego plan creatively used several standard land use
measures to manage the rate and direction of growth, though the options
then available limited its choice. Today, for example, there is greater
23 See id. at 5-2 ("The objective in identifying ... [planned urbanizing] areas is to
channel new growth into them in an orderly, logical sequence that enables the City to
expand facilities and services commensurate with growth.").
24 Professor Freilich did not propose a transfer of development rights program for the
environmental tier, probably because development rights transfer was then a new and
untried idea. For two discussions of transfer of development rights and other techniques
the city could have used in the environmental tier, see generally RICK PRUETZ, SAVED BY
DEVELOPMENT (1997) and Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches. A
Comparative Discussion of Environmental and Land Use Techniques in the United
States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 565 (1992).
25 See Witt & Samartino-Gardner, supra note 20, at 651.
26 See FREILICH, supra note 18, at 6-19,
27 For an analysis of the legal issues suggesting statutory authority and constitutional
problems in the program see generally JOHN M. WINTERS, AN INDEPENDENT LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF A GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR SAN DIEGO (1978) (on file with
author).
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support for programs that protect threatened environmental areas.28 An
innovative development exaction shifted the cost of new public facilities to
developers in the planned urbanizing area. Problems that arose later reflect,
to some extent, the political climate in which the program began. Its growth
restrictions were partly a response to an initiative proposal that would have
limited growth in the city. Yet the decision to make large areas unavailable
for development was both novel and dangerous, as the development industry
had never faced the obstacle that large areas of a municipality were off
limits. To reduce opposition to this policy, the city made concessions. It
removed a substantial area from the future urbanizing to the planned
urbanizing tier and dropped the open space tier from the program.29 Neither
did the city adopt legislation protecting natural resource and sensitive areas
until 1990.30
At first, the program succeeded. Development increased dramati-
cally in the urbanized areas, and growth in the planned urbanizing area de-
clined. A major factor in this shift in development preferences was the
absence of a development exaction in the urbanized areas.'
Problems arose with the facilities benefits assessment in the planned
urbanizing area. Judicial approval of the assessment took seven years,32 and
the collection of fees then lagged infrastructure needs.33 Problems also
28 See, e.g., Ann Louise Strong, Transfer of Development Rights to Protect Water
Resources, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Sept. 1998, at 3 (discussing TDRs generally,
and specifically considering the use of TDRs in four water resource protection programs
in the United States). See generally, e.g., Jeanne S. White, Beating Plowshares into
Townhomes: The Loss of Farmland and Strategies for Slowing Its Conversion to
Nonagricultural Uses, 28 ENVTL. L. 113 (1998) (discussing the importance of farming to
communities and the tools being used to preserve farmlands in several areas).
29 See Calavita, Ballot Box, supra note 16, at 7-8.
30 See id. at 16. See also Interview with Kenneth E. Sulzer, Executive Director, San
Diego Association of Governments (Jan. 25, 1999) (noting that habitat protection areas
adopted under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998), also restrict growth). See generally Craig Manson, Natural Communities
Conservation Planning: California's New Ecosystem Approach to Biodiversity, 24
ENVTL. L. 603 (1994) (discussing California's implementation of the Natural Community
Conservation Planning program and the possibility of a balance between endangered
species and economic concerns in communities).
" See Letter from Nico Calivita, Professor, San Diego State University (Mar. 31, 1999)
[hereinafter Calavita Letter] (on file with author).
32 See J.W. Jones Co. v. City of San Diego, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
'" See Calavita, Ballot Box, supra note 16, at 11 (noting that the considerable time lag
before facilities were actually built was a result of the lead-time needed to plan, design,
engineer, and actually construct public improvements).
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occurred in the urbanized area. An obsolete zoning code allowed eight-plex
apartment buildings in single-family neighborhoods, front-yard parking, and
other undesirable design practices that provoked neighborhood objections.34
Alarmed residents put pressure on the city to adopt legislation to protect
inner area neighborhoods from multifamily development.35
Problems also arose with the adequacy of public facilities in the
urbanized area. This area attracted development, as the city did not require
impact fees there, so only general budget revenues were available for
improving new facilities to adequate standards. These revenue sources
became inadequate soon after the city adopted the growth management pro-
gram, when state constitutional initiatives limited real property tax rates and
spending growth. The constitutional limitations made it impossible for the
city to finance needed capital improvements in the urbanized area, so
services and facilities deteriorated or became obsolete. Another problem
was that built-up neighborhoods began to demand higher public facility
standards. Planners had assumed that existing infrastructure in these
neighborhoods would be sufficient.
Demands for more development put pressure on the urban reserve,
an area where the program planned for development later. Citizens became
concerned when the city council began to shift too much urban reserve land
to the planned urbanizing area, where development could occur.36 In 1985,
voters adopted an initiative that requires voter approval for any shift from
the urban reserve to the planned urbanizing area,37 but this victory was short-
lived. Voters have approved two projects under this initiative, and later
initiatives intended to limit growth failed.38
A new form of low-density development that escapes the 1985
initiative has also become popular. Developers took advantage of a city
3 See Porter, Effort, supra note 16, at 25.
" See Calavita, Ballot Box, supra note 16, at 16.
36 See ROGER W. CAVES, LAND USE PLANNING: THE BALLOT Box REVOLUTION 140-53
(1992).
" The hardening of public opposition to development in areas reserved for development
occurred in both San Diego and Portland. Without careful examination of growth trends
and land availability, however, it is difficult to determine whether public opposition was
justified. In Oregon, moreover, popular initiative could not change the program because
it was mandated by state law. See id. at 152-53.
31 See Telephone Interview with Nico Calavita, Professor, San Diego State University
(Jan. 20, 1999) [hereinafter Calavita Interview]. In November 1998 voters turned down
an initiative that would have established an urban growth boundary for the county. See
id.; CAVES, supra note 36, at 153-62.
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policy that allows clustered developments on four-acre lots in the urban
reserve. This type of development does not need voter approval under the
1985 initiative because it does not require reclassification from the urban
reserve to the planned urbanizing area. It also has a ready market among
affluent homebuyers who seek an exclusive residential environment.
The city's response to these problems has been slow and inadequate.
It has delayed the implementation of ordinances that protect sensitive lands
and limit the introduction of multifamily development in residential
neighborhoods. The city hired its original consultant late in 1989 to work
with a growth management team on improvements in the program, but the
council rejected their proposals.39
The San Diego history illustrates some common problems faced by
spatial growth management programs. First, events outside the program had
a major effect, especially on the fiscal side. Judicial delay in the approval of
the assessments for capital facilities is one example. Fiscal measures must
receive legal approval before a city can use them safely, which means that
innovation, though necessary, is risky. Innovative regulatory controls may
also face a legal challenge that delays implementation.
The San Diego experience also shows that space management can
arouse damaging resistance if it modifies market expectations in land
development. San Diego's tier program conflicts with the American prefer-
ence for minimum development controls.4" The density curve is normally
less pronounced than what the San Diego program requires, as development
is usually less intensive in the core and more intensive in outlying areas.
Cutting against this preference meant, over time, that unexpected coalitions
would unite against the program. Developers tried to undermine the urban
reserve, while inner city residents protested the development and
infrastructure problems the program brought. Political support weakened. "l
" See Calavita, Ballot Box, supra note 16, at 17. The proposals included citywide impact
fees, level of service (LOS) standards and a capital facilities plan to meet LOS standards,
and phasing of new development if it exceeded the demand for transportation facilities
beyond what could by accommodated on the basis of the capital facilities plan. In 1987,
the city had also adopted an interim development ordinance that set limits on residential
construction for eighteen months. See id. at 12.
40 See Dan Eggen, Local Controls Fail to Restrict Growth, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1998, at
B1.
" See Porter, Effort, supra note 16, at 22-24. The need to seek voter approval of
initiatives to limit the city council's control over the program indicates the extent to
which interest groups perceived a lack of political support. See generally Christopher
Leo et al., Is Urban Sprawl Back on the Political Agenda? Local Growth Control,
810 [Vol. 23:801
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In the urban reserve, large lot zoning selected to carry out the
program may have made it vulnerable to new development.4" Because the
program preserved this area by limiting growth, its open character attracted
low-density development, and the voter initiative did not prohibit it.
Although the 1985 initiative did slow development in the urban reserve by
requiring voter approval to shift land to the planned urbanizing area, voters
ultimately approved two projects.
The San Diego example also shows that attention to implementation
detail is essential. One problem was that the program made development
policy choices in each tier, but did not have a strategy for allocating and
phasing development inside the tiers.43 There was no strategy, for example,
for allocating development within the inner urbanized area. This omission
created difficulties when the time came to make development decisions in
the tiers, and the city delayed the adoption of a development strategy that
could deal with these problems. It finally adopted a plan for the urban
reserve in the early 1990s that made strategic choices in that area, and that
called for the preparation of subarea plans. The city has adopted some of
these plans."
1I1. THE OREGON URBAN GROWTH BOUNDARY PROGRAM
Oregon's state land use and urban growth boundary (UGB)
programs are well-known growth management systems.45 A set of state
Regional Growth Management, and Politics, 34 URB. AFF. REV. 179 (1998) (arguing that
attempts to control sprawl have failed, in large part, because regional growth
management initiatives have not successfully been distinguished from unpopular growth
controls).
42 Large lot zoning is a problematic zoning technique, and courts have found it
unconstitutional when used for exclusionary purposes. See National Land & Inv. Co. v.
Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 612-13 (Pa. 1965). This problem does not seem to have arisen in
San Diego.
4' Developing this kind of strategy was not part of the work program for the growth
management plan. See FREILICH, supra note 18, at 1-5.
" See Calavita Letter, supra note 31.
4' For surveys of the Oregon program, see generally AMERICAN PLANNING ASS'N,
LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK PHASES I & II, INTERIM EDITION 6-43 (1998); GERRIT KNAAP
& ARTHUR C. NELSON, THE REGULATED LANDSCAPE: LESSONS ON STATE LAND USE
PLANNING FROM OREGON (1992); Carl Abbott, The Portland Region: Where City and
Suburbs Talk to Each Other-and Often Agree, 8 HOUS. POL'Y DEBATE 11 (1997);
Robert L. Liberty, Oregon's Comprehensive Growth Management Program: An Imple-
mentation Review and Lessons for Other States, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,367
1999]
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planning goals adopted by the state Land Conservation and Development
Commission (LCDC) are its critical elements.46 LCDC reviews local plans
and land use regulations and approves them if they comply with the state
goals. Local land use regulations and decisions must be consistent with the
approved plan. A special tribunal, the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA),
hears appeals on land use decisions after appellants exhaust all local
appeals.47
The principal state planning goal that mandates growth management
is an urbanization goal that requires incorporated municipalities to adopt
urban growth boundaries. Local governments must draw a clear line
between areas that can urbanize and areas that must remain non-urban.
Local governments must apply seven factors contained in the urbanization
goal to decide on the size of the urban growth boundary.48 Incorporated
municipalities apply these factors to designate enough growth within their
UGB to provide an adequate land supply for twenty years. A UGB can, and
usually does, extend beyond municipal boundaries. The Portland regional
planning agency administers this program in the Portland metropolitan area
(1992); and Edward J. Sullivan, Marking the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of SB 100, OR. L.
REV. (forthcoming). For a critique of state land use systems, see generally JERRY WEITZ,
EVOLUTION OF STATE SPONSORED LAND USE PLANNING (forthcoming 1999).
46 These goals were legislatively mandated upon creation of the UGB. See OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 197.225-.245 (1991).
17 The term "land use decision" is defined in id. § 197.015(10), and a rich and varied case
law that tends to lead the Land Use Board of Appeals to review most local actions
affecting land use in case of doubt.
4" The seven factors are:
(1) the demonstrated need to accommodate long-range urban popula-
tion growth requirements consistent with LCDC goals;
(2) the need for housing, employment opportunities, and livability;
(3) the orderly and economic provision for public facilities and
services;
(4) the maximum efficiency of land uses within and on the fringe of the
existing urban area;
(5) the environmental, energy, economic, and social consequences;
(6) the retention of agricultural land as defined, with Class I the highest
priority for retention and Class VI the lowest priority; and
(7) the compatibility of the proposed urban uses with nearby
agricultural activities.
DEPARTMENT OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., OREGON'S STATEWIDE PLANNING
GOALS AND GUIDELINES (1995). The first two factors are called the "need" factors.
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and is responsible for making decisions about the boundary.49  The state
housing goal, supplemented by legislation," requires local governments to
provide needed affordable housing within UGB boundaries.
A key purpose of the state program is the preservation of the
Willamette Valley in western Oregon, which has most of the state's valuable
agricultural land and most of its population. A complementary agricultural
goal requires the preservation of agricultural areas, and the statutes authorize
adoption of exclusive farm use zones to reinforce this goal."' The statutes
also require a minimum eighty-acre lot size in exclusive agricultural zones.52
Enforcement is the primary problem. Growth can occur outside UGBs in
agricultural areas known as "exception lands." 3  These are lands either
committed to urbanization or needed for other uses.54
Observers agree that the preservation of agricultural and other
natural resource areas were the primary motivation behind the urbanization
goal and the UGB policy." These priorities mean that the UGB, unlike San
Diego tiers, is not primarily a measure to shape urban growth. The state
planning goals also do not include a strategy for allocating development
49 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.301-.302.
" The housing requirements are at id. §§ 197.303-.314. Section 197.307(3)(a) provides
an example of one such requirement:
When a need has been shown for housing within an urban growth
boundary at particular price ranges and rent levels, needed housing,
including housing for seasonal and year-round farmworkers, shall be
permitted in one or more zoning districts or in zones described by some
comprehensive plans as overlay zones with sufficient buildable land to
satisfy that need.
sI See id. § 215.203.
52 See OR. REv. STAT. § 215.780 (Supp. 1998). Smaller lot sizes are allowed as
exceptions under strict conditions. See id. 9§ 215.780(2)(a)-(b). The statute also
requires an 80-acre lot size minimum for forest zones, and a 160-acre minimum for the
rangeland agricultural area. See id. §§ 215.780(l)(b)-(c).
13 See §§ 197.732(l)(a)-(c). See also 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land Conservation and
Development Commission, 724 P.2d 268, 279 (Or. 1986) (explaining the three types of
exceptions local governments can use under sections 197.732(1)(a)-(c)).
54 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.732(1)(a)-(c) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
5' See Wendie L. Kellington, Oregon's Land Use Program Comes of Age: The Next 25
Years, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Oct. 1998, at 3-4; Weitz & Moore, supra note 7, at
431. But see EASLEY, supra note 13, at 5 (quoting purposes of the UGB for Salem,
which also include the efficient and economic provision of services, and the matching of
services with population growth).
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within a UGB.
An important measure of the program's success is the extent to
which growth has occurred inside, rather than outside, UGBs. Unlike San
Diego, Portland provides public facilities and subsidies inside the urban
growth boundary to encourage development,56 although highway congestion
is a problem. 7 Studies of the UGBs, some limited to Portland, do find that a
substantial portion of new development has occurred within UGBs5 A
study of development inside the UGBs also showed a substantial amount of
development occurring in or next to the urban core, as intended. 9 Density
increases inside the Portland UGB are impressive, 60 but densities are lower
than the program intended. Lower densities have occurred even though
zoning that discourages housing or makes it more costly is prohibited by
statute,' and though LCDC requires six to ten units per acre for the Portland
area on undeveloped, residentially-designated lands.62
One of the reasons why higher-density development has not
occurred inside the UGBs is that opposition to this type of development has
become increasingly common.63 Developers became disillusioned when
they could not build at the expected densities promised by the program at its
adoption. 4
Development has continued to occur at low densities in so-called
56 See Calavita Interview, supra note 38.
5 See Kellington, supra note 55, at 4.
58 See, e.g., id. (indicating that the Portland UGB is essentially full); Weitz & Moore,
supra note 7, at 424 ("[M]ore than 90 percent of Oregon's new residents between 1980
and 1989 located inside UGBs.").
'9 See Weitz & Moore, supra note 7, at 429 tbl.3.
60 See Rachel L. Schowalter, Reuse, Restore, Recycle: Historic Preservation as an
Alternative to Sprawl, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,418, 10,421 (1999) ("Since
Portland, Oregon, adopted its urban growth boundary in 1975, Portland's population has
grown by almost 50 percent, but it has used only 2 percent more land.").
61 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.307(6) (1998). The statute provides that local governments
must also have "approval standards" and "special conditions" which are "clear and
objective and shall not have the effect, either in themselves or cumulatively, of dis-
couraging needed housing through unreasonable cost or delay." Id. See also Rogue
Valley Ass'n of Realtors v. City of Ashland, LUBA No. 97-260 (Or. Land Use Bd. App.
Sept. 24, 1998) (invalidating approval standards in a steep slope ordinance).
62 See OR. ADMIN. R. 660-007-035 (1998).
63 See Editorial, Growth Land-Use Plans Must Be Enforced, ATLANTA J., Nov. 12, 1998,
at A26.
64 See Interview with Duane Desiderio and Grant Madsen, Representatives of the
National Association of Homebuilders, Dallas, Tex. (Jan. 13, 1999).
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exception areas65 'outside UGBs, often as spurious farms.66  This
development is substantial and undercuts the urban growth boundary
program, though it has slowed in recent years.67 The conversion of land
contiguous to UGBs to low-density development is especially troublesome
because it makes the extension of UGBs difficult. If low-density
development occurs on land next to the UGB, it will not be available for
high-density development when the boundary expands. The UGB must then
expand further than it should have been, and higher-density development
must leapfrog over the low-density development that is in the expansion
area. This is the very type of urban sprawl the urban growth boundary
program tries to prevent.
Oregon legislation now allows local governments to designate
"urban reserve areas" that are next to UGBs.6" These areas provide for the
long-term urban expansion and cost-effective provision of public facilities
and services when the UGB expands.69  Local governments are to give
priority to urban reserve areas when expanding urban growth boundaries.7"
Battle lines over development are more clearly drawn in the Oregon
UGBs than in San Diego because the UGB marks the boundary between
areas where urban development can and cannot occur. In San Diego, large
lot zoning in the urban reserve area permits low density development." In
65 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.73(l)(a)-(c) (1991 & Supp. 1998). These are areas that are
already developed for rural residential homesites or for commercial or industrial uses, or
are areas "committed" to development because of parcelization or installation of services
or because surrounding development makes farming and forestry impracticable. See
Liberty, supra note 45, at 10,387. See also 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Land
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 724 P.2d 268, 277-79 (Or. 1986) (explaining genesis,
application, and mechanics of exception areas).
6 See Nyran Rasche, Protecting Agricultural Lands in Oregon: An Assessment of the
Exclusive Farm Use Zone System, 77 OR. L. REv. 993, 997 (1998).
67 See Interview with Edward J. Sullivan, Attorney, Portland, Or. (Jan. 31, 1999).
61 See OR. REV. STAT. § 195.145 (Supp. 1998). The statute does not specify the
techniques that local governments must use to carry out this purpose, but states instead
that the Land Conservation and Development Commission "shall provide to local
governments a list of options, rather than prescribing a single planning technique, to
assure the efficient transition from rural to urban use in urban reserve areas." Id.
Designation of urban reserve areas is voluntary, but the LCDC may require a designation
in major metropolitan areas. Prohibiting the subdivision of land is one technique that can
keep urban reserve land clear for future development.
69 See id. § 195.145(4).
70 See id. § 197.298(l)(a).
"' See generally FREILICH, supra note 18.
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Oregon the program does not allow urban development outside the growth
boundary, though low-density residential development in exception areas
undermines this objective. Even so, there are significant price differences
between land inside and outside the urban growth boundary.72 The UGB is
not responsible for all of the price increase that has occurred inside the
boundary,73 but price increases aggravate affordable housing problems.74
A significant problem in the Oregon UGB program is deciding
where development should occur and at what densities. Development at low
densities inside the UGBs accelerates demands for boundary expansion,
which can damage the goal of preserving agricultural and forest lands.
Higher densities within the UGB reduce demand for boundary expansion
but create opposition from existing neighborhoods. Housing at higher den-
sities inside the UGB can be expensive and push lower-income housing out-
ward.75 Balancing these competing claims requires a carefully orchestrated
strategy, which is more difficult to secure. The statutes now authorize
density increases within a UGB to meet housing needs as an alternative to a
boundary expansion."
To help resolve these conflicting pressures, the Portland regional
planning agency has adopted an urban growth management plan as part of
its Metro 2040 Growth Concept, although opposition has slowed
implementation.77 The plan requires local governments to increase housing
densities and meet housing capacity standards set by the plan.78 The Growth
72 See Gerrit J. Knaap, The Price Effects of Urban Growth Boundaries in Metropolitan
Portland, Oregon, 61 LAND ECON. 26, 32-33 (1985); Arthur C. Nelson, Using Land
Markets to Evaluate Urban Containment Programs, 52 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 156, 160
(1986).
7 See Knaap, supra note 72, at 31; Nelson, supra note 72, at 162.
4 Housing affordability is problematic because of the prevailing, fairly low, average
income in the area. The rise in housing prices is also due, in part, to the emergence of a
fairly high-income segment of the labor force that wants large homes, even on small lots.
See Letter from Douglas R. Porter, President, Growth Management Institute (Feb. 22,
1999) (on file with author).
"5 See id.
76 See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.296(4)(b) (Supp. 1998). Model legislation proposed by the
American Planning Association requires monitoring of an urban growth boundary to
ensure that land supply remains adequate. See AMERICAN PLANNING ASS'N, supra note
45, § 6.201.1(9).
" See Robin Franzen & Brent Hunsberger, Have We Outgrown Our Approach to
Growth?, OREGONIAN, Dec. 13, 1998, at Al.
78 See Metropolitan Regional Service District, Urban Growth Management Functional
Plan (last modified Feb. 2, 1999) <http://www.multnomah.lib.or.us/metro/growth/tfplan/
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Concept, and the statute giving priority to urban reserve areas in boundary
expansions, are the bases for agency regulations for the review of growth
boundary expansions. These regulations supplement the state planning
goals.
The regulations create a category of "first tier urban reserves" that
have a priority in boundary expansions because they are areas where urban
services are most effectively provided. 79 A proposed boundary expansion
amendment also requires an urban reserve plan that provides for an average
minimum residential density of ten dwelling units to the acre and a diversity
of housing stock."0 Plans must ensure the orderly, economic and efficient
provision of urban services through annexation to a city, a city and county
agreement on planning and zoning,"1 or an urban services agreement. 2
These regulations reinforce the UGB program by giving priority to in-
boundary expansions to adjacent lands and by requiring reasonable densities
with assurances that adequate services are available.
The Oregon experience shows how expectations about development
opportunities and coalition shifts can affect program performance. The
development industry welcomed the UGB because it seemed to provide a
commitment to higher-density development inside UGBs. When opposition
arose within the UGB, the industry felt betrayed. Outside the UGB the
agricultural sector, though it usually supports the conversion of farmland,
joined environmentalists in a campaign to preserve even marginal agricul-
tural lands from development. The UGB may have become a symbol that
polarizes opposing interests and prevents meaningful consensus on growth
management strategies.
IV. DEFENDING AND IMPROVING STRATEGIES FOR GROWTH MANAGEMENT
Problems in the San Diego and Portland space management
programs do not diminish their importance as major innovations in land use
controls. Many problems are political. Opposition arose when program
costs not apparent up front became obvious. Opposition hardened in
funcplan.html>.
'9 See PORTLAND, OR. METROPOLITAN CODE § 3.01.010(e) (1993) available at
<http://www.multnomah.lib.or.us/metro/glance/metcode/metcodel .html>.
80 See id. §§ 3.01.012(e)(4)-(5).
"I See id. § 3.01.012(e)(1).
82 See id. § 3.01.012(e)(2). In addition, the expansion must assist in compliance with the
Growth Concept or other statutory or regulatory requirements for land within an urban
growth boundary. See id.
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Portland, for example, to expansion of the growth boundary and more
intensive development within it. 3 Framing a program around environmental
protection, as in Oregon, can also encourage a rigid defense of
environmental areas that prevents compromise.8 4 In San Diego, concessions
were made at the beginning, political support diminished, and the devel-
opment community applied pressure to weaken the program.85 Voters re-
sponded with initiatives that limited the city's freedom to make program
changes, but later initiatives lost and the use of the ballot box underscores
the loss of political support.8 6 The local basis for the program may also
make it more vulnerable. In Oregon, growth management through growth
boundaries is state-mandated, popular support has continued, and statewide
initiatives to weaken the program have lost.
Improvements in growth control techniques cannot eliminate
political opposition, but they can improve political acceptance by providing
clearer and more effective strategies for growth management. The San
Diego and Oregon experience shows that growth management programs
need improvement in their strategies for subordinate, second-level policies.
The San Diego tiers and the Oregon UGBs provide a framework for growth,
but subordinate strategies are not as well developed.
A. The Legal Defense of Growth Restrictions
1. Some Conceptual Problems
A perennial problem for growth management programs is to develop
strategies for limiting development where the program does not want
development to take place. Traditional land use controls cannot accomplish
" Opposition to high-density development near transit stations is an example. See
Douglas R. Porter, Transit-Focused Development: A Progress Report, 64 J. AM. PLAN.
ASS'N 475, 485 (1998) (noting that transit-focused development has encountered
neighborhood resistance and little governmental leadership in four regions). Porter notes
that some transit-oriented development has occurred in the Portland area. See id.
In San Diego, transit-oriented development has been limited by the location of
transit lines, limited land availability, market problems, and concerns about residential
development that was perceived as not paying its own way. See Marion G. Boarnet &
Nicholas S. Compin, Transit-Oriented Development in San Diego County: The Incre-
mental Implementation of a Planning Idea, 65 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 80, 90-92 (1999).
84 See Daniel R. Mandelker, Environmental Policy: The Next Generation, 64 TOWN
PLAN. REV. 107, 108-09 (1993).
" See id.
16 See id.
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this objective because they are usually lenient. Local governments do not
use zoning and other controls to place limits on where development can
occur, impose boundaries that identify growth opportunities, or forcefully
direct development to core areas. The San Diego and Oregon programs
made major changes in this system. They adopted boundaries that decide
where development can and cannot occur, and deliberately directed
development to the inner core. Strategies of this kind can create windfalls
for wipeouts problems because they dramatically affect development
opportunities and land prices on each side of the boundary line. These
problems, in turn, can create significant new legal difficulties for the
development control system. 7
Legal problems are most difficult on the side of the boundary where
development cannot occur. Development restrictions raise the familiar cry
that one group of landowners must accept deep losses in property value to
benefit the rest of the community. This is a well-known takings problem.
It is significant that there has not been a successful legal attack
against growth restrictions in either San Diego or Portland. One reason may
be the tradeoffs in development opportunities these programs provide. They
restrict development in some areas but provide development opportunities
elsewhere. Another explanation may be that the programs provided enough
opportunities for development so that legal attacks on growth restrictions are
not necessary. Shifts of urban reserve land in San Diego to allow their
development, and development opportunities on exception lands in Oregon,
are examples.
The boundary may also affect expectations in ways that diminish
taking of property objections. The urban growth boundary in Portland, for
example, must allow enough land for twenty years of growth. Since the
" It is not clear, of course, that urban growth boundaries and development tiers are
entirely responsible for the price effects that occur where these controls are used. An
answer to the cause-and-effect question is not important, however, to landowners inside
and outside the boundary. Inside the growth boundaries, higher land prices create
pressure for intense development, and can create equity problems if higher prices mean
that lower income households cannot find adequate housing. It should also be pointed
out that dramatic price differences on either side of the boundary are only different in
degree from the price differentials that always occur in developing areas. In the absence
of a growth boundary, however, the price curve will slope gradually. There will not be
the dramatic fall-off that occurs at the boundary line. See TOM DANIELS, WHEN CITY
AND COUNTRY COLLIDE: MANAGING GROWTH IN THE METROPOLITAN FRINGE 190
(1999); Keith W. Dearborn & Ann M. Gygi, Planner's Panacea or Pandora's Box: A
Realistic Assessment of the Role of Urban Growth Areas in Achieving Growth
Management Goals, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 975, 977-78 (1993).
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boundary is likely to expand when this land supply is no longer available,
adjacent land near the boundary has a good expectation of development in a
reasonable time after twenty years.8" The question is whether a restriction
on development for this period is a taking of property. If courts will accept
that a delay in the development of property of this length is not a taking,
then restrictions on development in growth management programs are safe
from a takings attack.
The Ramapo case upheld delays in development to carry out a
growth management program." There, a growth management program
deferred growth for as long as eighteen years and permitted development
only when designated public facilities and services were available. The New
York Court of Appeals rejected a takings claim because it held the delay was
part of a reasonable program for controlling growth.90 A court could apply
this kind of reasoning to delays in development that occur in areas near
growth boundaries because those delays are also limited in time. How much
delay a court will accept is another question.
Supreme Court cases decided since Ramapo raise other questions. It
is now clear the courts require compensation for a temporary taking for the
period a regulation was in effect before a court holds it violates the takings
clause.9' In addition, the Court's Lucas decision held a land use regulation
that does not allow an economically viable use is a taking per se.92 That case
found a per se taking when a beach setback in a coastal management
program deprived a landowner of all economically viable use of his land.93
The Court would not consider the purpose statement in the act as a basis for
88 In Portland, the metropolitan district has defined the "urban reserve" as "land likely to
be needed ... for a 30 to 50 year period." PORTLAND, OR. METROPOLITAN CODE §
3.01.010 (1998), available at <http://www.multnomah.lib.or.us/metro/glance/metcode/
metcodel.html>. However, under the rules that apply to the program, land closest to the
urban growth boundary are likely to be considered first in any urban growth boundary
amendment.
89 See Golden v. Ramapo Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
9 See id. at 304-05.
See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304,
318-19 (1987). Language in First English suggests that a temporary moratorium on
development might not be a taking. See id. at 321 (noting that the Court did not have
before it a "case of normal delays" in obtaining building permits, zoning changes, and the
like).
92 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-19 (1992).
93 See id.
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upholding the restriction.94 The Lucas per se takings rule, and the require-
ment that compensation is payable for a temporary taking when a land use
regulation is unconstitutional, could invalidate temporary restrictions on
development in growth boundary programs. If the program does not allow
any development on land outside the growth boundary, a court could find a
temporary taking for the period during which this restriction was in effect.95
In areas further from the boundary line, the delay in development
may be substantial, so an argument that the program requires only a
temporary delay in development may not apply. In these areas, however, the
economics of a taking claim may discourage a takings attack. If the
landowner believes the discounted development value of her land at a future
date is worth more than what she might recover as compensation in a
takings suit then she will not sue. Discounted value may be higher because
land values will rise as development occurs in adjoining and surrounding
areas.
96
94 See id. at 1031 ("We emphasize that to win its case South Carolina must do more than
proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the
public interest .... ).
9' Similar issues arise when communities impose moratoria, either to provide an
opportunity to revise comprehensive plans and land use regulations, or to prohibit
development until public facilities are adequate to serve the new development. If the
moratorium is a taking because it prohibits all development during the moratorium
period, a court could award compensation for the time the moratorium was in effect. See
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAw § 6.11 (4th ed. 1997).
96 If a landowner delays in bringing a takings claim, the delay may work against her
because a court may hold that a self-imposed delay means a landowner does not have
investment-backed expectations that were frustrated by the development restriction. See
Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1230 (9th Cir.); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp.2d 1226, 1240-41 (D. Nev.
1999) (appeal pending). Courts consider investment-backed expectations when they
apply the Penn Central balancing test to takings claims. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-35 (1978) (providing three relevant factors to
consider when examining a takings claim: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on
the landowner, (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed
expectations, and (3) the character of the governmental action).
An exception to the Lucas per se taking rule may also bar landowners who bought
land after the UGB was adopted from making takings claims. Lucas held that property
was subject to "background principles" of state law. See Lucas at 1029. Although the
Court did not explain what this term means, some courts have held that a landowner who
buys land takes title subject to legislation adopted before she acquired title. See, e.g.,
Gazza v. New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1040-42 (N.Y.
1997) (refusing to find a taking where a homeowner was denied a setback variance for
wetland regulations known by him to be in existence prior to his purchase of the
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If a landowner brings a takings claim, the critical question is whether
the land use restriction is a per se taking because it denies all economically
viable use of the property. What is a denial of economically viable use is
not clear. In Lucas, the Court did not decide whether there must be a
developmental use of the property to avoid a claim that a regulation does not
allow an economically viable use. 7 Some cases have held the key question
is whether there is a competitive and realistic market for the land that is
subject to restriction." This means there must be a market of buyers who
are willing to buy the land for development, not for speculation. It does not
mean the land use regulation allows a developmental use of the property. If
this market exists, there is no taking, but this view may not be a correct
interpretation of the Supreme Court's Lucas decision.
2. Control Techniques for Limiting Development
This discussion of takings problems in growth restriction areas can
provide guidance on the type of controls that can limit development yet not
create takings problems.99 Exclusive agricultural zoning, as in Oregon, is
property); Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Iowa 1994) ("[T]he 'bundle of
rights' the plaintiffs acquired by their fee simple title did not include the right to use the
land contrary to the provision of those three Iowa Code sections.... These sections and
their resulting prohibitions concerning the use of land ran-so to speak-with the
land.").
9 See Lucas at 1019 n.8.
9 See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1433 (9th Cir. 1996)
(finding that since a sufficient number of people would buy the property for the restricted
use it is "commercially marketable"), aff'd on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999);
Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding that when
determining fair market value a detailed inquiry into motivation and sophistication of
buyers is not necessary).
'9 Controls explicitly adopted to defer development on a temporary basis are another
possibility. The well-known Ramapo case upheld a growth management program that
delayed development for up to eighteen years, and authorized the approval of new
development only when served by adequate public facilities and services. See Golden v.
Ramapo Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 302 (N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972). The town based its growth management plan on a comprehensive plan, and
the New York court relied on the plan in upholding these restrictions on development.
See id. Moratoria and other controls that delay development temporarily are now
vulnerable under the Supreme Court's recent takings cases as invalid temporary takings.
Some courts since First English have held that interim planning moratoria are not
takings. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that an interim ordinance was not a taking);
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one option. Agricultural protection is clearly a legitimate governmental
objective,"° and the courts uphold agricultural zoning against takings claims
when land is presently used or suitable for agriculture.'' A Lucas per se
taking does not arise.
Controls that restrict development in sensitive environmental areas
are other possibilities. These controls can present takings problems0 2 under
the Lucas decision0 3 because they often prevent any developmental uses,
but this problem has not yet been serious. In the wetlands cases, for exam-
ple, courts have dismissed takings claims where the property was not all
wetlands, and the landowner could carry out an economically viable use on
that part of the land.0 4 Takings problems have arisen only when a permit
denial or regulation prohibits development on small single lots. 5  This
problem should not occur in undeveloped areas outside growth boundaries
where land holdings are likely to be extensive.
Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d 701 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a gaming
moratorium was not a taking absent extraordinary delay); Woodbury Place Partners v.
City of Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that there was no
taking in an adoption of a two-year moratorium).
However, although a delay in developing land outside a UGB may be temporary, the
restriction on land that prevents development is not adopted as a temporary restriction.
This fact may lead a court to hold, as it did in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 34 F.
Supp. 2d at 1248-51, that the restriction is not the equivalent of a moratorium, and that a
taking has occurred.
"o See Boundary Drive Assocs. v. Shrewsbury Township Bd. of Supervisors, 491 A.2d
86, 90 (Pa. 1985). See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (refusing
to find a compensable taking in California's open-space plans).
"'1 See MANDELKER, supra note 95, § 12.10. See, e.g., Still v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 600 P.2d 433 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (upholding rejection of non-farm
development that violates agricultural preservation policy in exclusive agricultural zone
even if economically unfeasible to farm land and no interference with farming in
surrounding area).
102 For examples of excellent treatises on the law of takings, see generally R. MELTZ ET
AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE (1999) and STEPHEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS (1996).
"03 The Court in Lucas clearly indicated that regulations denying a property owner all
"economically viable use of his land' are per se takings. See Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-19 (1992) (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
"o See, e.g., K & K Constr., Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 575 N.W.2d 531,
535-38 (Mich. 1998) (holding that for a permit application where there was a single
comprehensive development comprised of several tracts in common ownership, the
parcel under consideration included those tracts).
,o See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. C1. 37 (1994) (upholding a takings claim
for denial of a permit for development of wetlands under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1994)).
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When agricultural zoning or environmental land use regulations are
not an option, growth management programs may have to rely on large lot,
single-family residential zoning, as in San Diego. Large lot zoning can be
an effective restriction on development when it zones densities so low that
they discourage development, but that kind of zoning can raise legitimacy
and takings problems.
Courts may accept large lot zoning at low densities when it imple-
ments a growth management program contained in a comprehensive plan.0 6
An important pre-Lucas Maryland case upheld restrictive large lot zoning
that implemented a growth management program in Montgomery County,
next to Washington, D.C.' °7 The county downzoning allowed two dwelling
units an acre to protect watersheds and a green belt in a fifty-square mile
area around a satellite community designated in a master plan."8 The master
plan promoted the physical isolation of the community from urban sprawl,
and carried out a corridor plan adopted for the metropolitan region.'" The
court relied on the purpose of the master plan to hold that downzoning was
not a taking of property."'
Zoning of this type is more problematic after Lucas because a court
can hold that it deprives a landowner of all economically viable use of her
land. This issue remains open, though a post-Lucas Maryland case upheld a
comprehensive zoning at five dwelling units to the acre adopted to
implement a comprehensive plan."' This zoning protected the Baltimore
watershed from unsuitable development and prevented urban sprawl." 2 The
"06 Support can be found for this position in Justice Brennan's opinion in Penn Central,
although it was not fully developed. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See also Daniel R. Mandelker, Waiving the Taking Clause:
Conflicting Signals from the Supreme Court, in 1994 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON
PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 57 (Southwestern Legal Foundation ed.,
1995) (noting the convoluted nature of takings jurisprudence).
107 See Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 A.2d 700
(Md. 1969). It should be noted that in this author's opinion the Maryland courts are
more receptive than most to local government land use regulations.
08 See id. at 703.
o See id. at 703-04.
... The court held that the landowner "did not, by an Olney plan country mile, meet their
heavy burden of showing that the rezoning they dispute confiscates their property." Id.
at 706.
... See Security Management Corp. v. Baltimore County, 655 A.2d 1326, 1328 (Md. Ct.
App.). The court also rejected equal protection and due process claims. See id. at 1330-
33.
112 See id. at 1329.
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court held the Lucas per se taking rule did not apply because the zoning re-
striction did not leave the property economically idle." 3
Densities at two or five dwelling units to the acre, which the
Maryland cases approved, may be too high to prevent development
effectively in areas permanently restricted from growth in growth
management programs. 14 Lower residential densities may be vulnerable to
a takings attack, though judicial tolerance for very low density zoning when
used to implement a growth management program may be higher than
expected." 5 Low-density zoning may also provide an escape hatch for
affluent housing in areas where growth is not supposed to occur.
Transfer of development rights (TDR) programs are another strategy
that can help avoid Takings Clause claims in areas where a growth
management program prohibits development. TDR programs help avoid
these problems because they provide for the transfer of development rights
from restricted areas to areas where development can occur."6 Compensa-
tion paid by buyers of rights to sellers can fully or partially mitigate a
takings claim." 7 The best example of a TDR program that supports growth
management is the Montgomery County, Maryland program that protects
the county's agricultural area from development. "8 Nevertheless, TDR
programs in extensive agricultural or natural resource areas are difficult to
implement if the market will not generate the trades necessary to provide
adequate compensation to sellers of rights. The volume of rights for sale in
restricted areas must be in balance with the growth allowed in growth areas
to make a TDR program work.' 9 If this balance does not occur, additional
public intervention through development rights banks that can buy and hold
development rights may be necessary, but banks may be expensive to create
and difficult to manage. 2 ° Montgomery County may be unique because its
"1' See id. at 1330. The county council had rejected a rezoning to 16 dwelling units to
the acre in what the developer called an "environmentally sensitive" community.
114 One commentator has suggested clustering techniques for developments in large lots
that can leave room for future infill development when a UGB expands. See EASLEY,
supra note 13, at 14. How effective this technique can be is problematic.
,' The courts have upheld zoning for up to five-acre lots when necessary because of
environmental conditions. See MANDELKER, supra note 95, § 5.26.
116 See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer et al., Transfer of Development Rights After Suitum,
30 URB. LAW. 441, 444-48 (1998).
..7 See id. at 444-46.
1s See PRUETZ, supra note 24, at 210-14.
119 See Barry C. Field & Jon M. Conrad, Economic Issues in Programs of Transferable
Development Right, 51 LAND ECON. 331, 338 (1975).
20 See Sarah J. Stevenson, Note, Banking on TDRs: The Government's Role as Banker
1999] 825
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
location next to the national capital creates a strong demand for office space.
This demand supports the market for development rights.
B. Strategies to Intensify Development Where it is Needed
Space management programs usually encourage higher density
development in areas inside the boundaries to offset restrictions on
development outside the boundaries. Higher density development often
occurs as infill in existing neighborhoods and usually requires upzonings.
Residents of these neighborhoods may object if they believe higher densities
will have a negative effect on their neighborhoods and may attack upzoning
for higher density development as spot zoning. Courts strike down
upzonings as spot zoning if they are incompatible with the surrounding area
and do not provide a public benefit."'
This problem has two dimensions. One problem is at the design and
scale level. A zoning ordinance may allow intensive development in
existing neighborhoods with poor design or out of scale with its
environment. Neighbors then resist and oppose proposals for new
development. Attention to design and scale in land development regulations
can allow more intensive development that does not destroy existing
neighborhood character.
Even good design is not enough if higher density development is the
real objection, which is often the case. A growth management strategy for
urbanized areas must provide a framework for new development that
existing residents can accept. Adequate design review, density floors and
ceilings in residentially designated areas, periodic review of how the munici-
pality has dealt with new residential uses, and the funding of infrastructure
"banks" the municipality can draw on for capital facilities illustrate
measures that local governments can consider.'22
Local governments may also have to face the impact fee issue in
built-up areas, though levying impact fees in these areas may make it more
difficult to attract new development. The basic issue is fairness, and
deciding when a municipality can shift the cost of new capital facilities to
the private sector. If new development in established neighborhoods creates
a demand for new or improved facilities, the case for shifting costs to the
of Transferable Development Rights, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1329, 1371 (1998).
... See MANDELKER, supra note 95, §§ 6.27-6.30.
22 am indebted to Ed Sullivan for these suggestions.
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private side is compelling.'23
Municipalities also need to adopt plans for the development of
urbanized areas that decide where new development will go and at what
densities. There are attempts to do just this in plans, such as urban village
and urban center plans, which allocate new development within cities.'24
Courts will uphold upzonings that implement a comprehensive plan against
objections that they improperly favor an individual landowner at the expense
of his neighbors." 5 Specifying the intensity of growth that must occur
within growth boundaries can also help. Model legislation proposed by the
American Planning Association requires urban growth areas to contain land
at "minimum densities and intensities."'26 They must accommodate a desig-
nated percentage of the growth expected to occur within the region or county
in which the urban growth area is located.'27
Programs to allow new development in urbanizing areas are less
difficult to manage. Raw land converts to development in this process, and
usually there are no neighbors who can object that development is too
intensive. Techniques such as floating zones and planned unit development
regulations can authorize new development as it occurs, and require
compliance with the growth management program.
Assuring adequate public facilities in urbanizing areas is a more
difficult problem. In San Diego and Portland, new development has
overwhelmed public facilities, especially highways, despite attempts to
ensure adequate public facilities as growth occurs. The courts finally upheld
the facilities benefit assessment in San Diego, but exactions on development
are more difficult to defend following Supreme Court decisions that place
the burden on municipalities to justify exactions. 2 ' Some transportation
23 There may be legal problems in levying impact fees in established neighborhoods if
the municipality does not have the authority to levy these fees in connection with the
issuance of a building permit or other development approval, such as a conditional use.
See, e.g., Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 351 P.2d 765 (Cal. 1960) (holding that a
zoning board had implied power to attach condition requiring dedication of land). The
opportunity to levy fees as part of subdivision approval does not usually exist because
inner city areas are built-up.
24 The plan for King County in Seattle, Washington is an example. See DOUGLAS R.
PORTER, PROFILES IN GROWTH MANAGEMENT 230-55 (1996).
25 See MANDELKER, supra note 95, §§ 6.32-6.34.
126 Id.
127 See id. § 201.1(6)(a).
128 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (requiring that government's
permit condition does not impose more than a proportionate degree of burden on the
landowner).
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facilities, such as highway interchanges and mass transit, arguably are a
public responsibility and not subject to exaction.
Attempts to resolve this problem by requiring adequate public
facilities before a local government approves new development do not
always succeed. Defining adequate service levels is difficult, matching
incremental development to public facility planning is not easy, and service
deficiencies have encouraged sprawl by forcing development to outlying ar-
eas.'29 A similar "concurrency" requirement that likewise attempts to
require adequate facilities when new development receives approval has also
proved difficult to manage.1 30
There is no magic fix that can ensure the provision of necessary
capital facilities and services in growth management programs. There must
be adequate public facilities budgeting, firm fiscal support and developer
exactions that have an adequate legal basis.
V. CONCLUSION
Space management strategies that dramatically shape the pattern of
development are powerful control measures in growth management
programs. Their primary purpose is to designate areas where growth cannot
occur and where it is encouraged. Like other land use programs with single-
issue or limited objectives, they are overlays on existing land development
regulations. They may pay some attention to development densities in areas
where growth can occur and to development restrictions in areas where
growth cannot occur. They do not pay enough attention to more detailed
subordinate strategies that can manage growth in growth-designated areas
and prohibit growth where the program restricts it.
This strategic failure makes it difficult to strike a program balance
that can link the decision on how much area to commit to growth with the
129 See PORTER, supra note 13, at 122-133.
30 See S. MECK, MODEL STATUTES ON UNIFORM DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS,
CONCURRENCY AND SMART GROWTH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (Apr. 19, 1999) (draft on
file with author); PORTER, supra note 13, at 131. See e.g., FLA. DEPT. OF TRANSP.,
REPORT OF TRANSPORTATION AND LAND USE STUDY COMMITTEE 19-32 (1999) (on file
with author). The concurrency requirement, as stated in Florida legislation, is intended to
provide "that public facilities and services needed to support development shall be
available concurrent with the impacts of such development." FLA. STAT. ANN. §
163.3177(10)(h) (West 1999). In Florida, the concurrency requirement has tended to
force new development to the urban fringe, where service levels are higher. See FLA.
DEPT. OF TRANSP., supra.
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decision on how much area to restrict. Finding the correct balance
between growth and growth restriction is the key that will determine the
success or failure of a space management strategy.
The imperative of managing change is another important lesson
from San Diego and Oregon. Planning for growth management before the
fact, in a political environment that may be uncertain at best, is clearly not
the easiest task. Governments must adopt the most effective strategies
available when they create these programs, but they must also monitor and
respond to change. The alternative, as the Governor of Oregon warns, is
the impossible.
